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BAR BRIEFS
Strangulation of a pre-existing hernia is an accident within the
terms of the compensation law.-Krenz vs Ferguson Coal Co., 154 N.
E. 35 (Ind.) (This is contra to the great majority of decisions, though
most states now handle the matter by special clauses in the law.)-
(Krueger vs King Midas Co., 21o N. W. 871, should be read in con-
nection with this one.)
0
Disability which is the direct result of mental disorder that was
brought on by a physical injury is compensable. (This agrees with
the N. D. Bureau's decision last year in a case where the injured per-
son, as a result of severe physical injuries, became mentally unbalanced
and committed suicide."-Armour Grain Co. vs Industrial Commis-
sion, 153 N. E. 699 (Ill.)
0
The term "complete and permanent loss of use of right arm," with-
in the terms of the Compensation Act, means that the claimant is not
able to use it in any character of employment to earn wages, and it
is not sufficient to show that the use is so impaired that he cannot use
it to perform his former work or similar work.-Bell & Zoller Co. vs
Industrial Commission, 153 N. E. 58o (Ill.)
0
Widow, whose husband was killed in course of employment,
brought suit against a third party liable, later settling for $i,OOO. She
then applied for compensation, the $i,ooo being deducted from amount
of the regular award. It was held that this was proper and that it
did not deprive the employer of his rights under the provision of the law
subrogating him to rights of the injured against third parties.-Benoit
Mining Co. vs Moore, lO9 Southern 878 (Ala.)
-0--
An award of compensation can not be based on possibilities or
probabilities but must be based on evidence, the preponderance of
which shows that claimant incurred a disability in the course of em-
ployment. Claimant failed in proving that endocarditis was caused
or aggravated by blows received in altercation with customer.-Stan-
dard Oil Co. vs Industrial Commission, 153 N. E. 660 (Ill.)
0
On April 19 an employee sustained a fracture of the fourth meta-
carpal bone of left hand. This was treated from time to time. In
May it was discovered, through X-rays, that there was a foreign sub-
stance in the finger. This was found to be a piece of steel imbedded
in finger several years before, while working for another employer.
June 2nd following the necessary minor operation for removal of the
steel was performed. The operation lasted about five minutes, and
returned to work a few minutes thereafter the employee began cough-
ing. He walked up six flights of stairs to doctor's office and there
died, the cause being assigned as acute dilation of the heart. The
widow sought compensation, but it was held that she failed to prove
that there was any connection between the fracture and the employee's
death.-Armour & Co. vs Industrial Commission, 153 N. E. 716 (Ill.)
CASE NOTES.
WITNESSES - IMPEACHMENT - INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.
Witness on cross-examination was asked whether he had not, on a
specified occasion, made a statement which was inconsistent with his
testimony. An objection to this question was sustained. Held,
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Error. Such statements are admissible for the purpose of impeach-
ing the credibility of the witness. Bryngelson v. Farmers' Grain Co.,
(N. D.) 2IO N. W. 19 (1926).
There are said to be four modes of impeaching the credit of a
witness: (i) By cross-examination; (2) By disproving his statements
made in court, by the testimony of other witnesses; (3) By proving
statements of the witness made out of court, inconsistent with or con-
tradictory to those made by him on the witness stand; (4) By proving
his general bad character for veracity. JONES ON EVIDENCE, 2d. ed.
sec. 844. The principal case illustrates the third of these modes, and
it is the most familiar practice in judicial procedure for the purpose
of impeaching the witness. It is well settled that before such incon-
sistent statements can be shown by testimony of other witnesses, a
foundation must be laid as in the principal case, by first interrogating
the witness with reference to such statements. Big Three Min., etc.,
Co. v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 107 Pac. 301, Note: 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
914. This requirement is reasonable, in all fairness to the witness.
He must be questioned as to whether or not he made such inconsistent
statements. Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich. 371, 62 NW. 833; so that he may
have an opportunity to deny, admit, explain or qualify its meaning.
Rooker v. Deering S. W. Ry Co., (Mo.) 226 S. W. 69; Brown v. Gil-
lett, 33 Wash. 264, 74 Pac. 386; Note: 21 L. R. A. 428. His atten-
tion must be called to the conversation on which it is proposed to con-
tradict him, and also to the time, place and person to whom he is sup-
posed to have made such statements. Standard Oil Co. v. Van Etten,
107 U. S. 325, 27 U. S. (L. Ed.) 319; Koehler v. Buhl, 94
Mich 496, 54 N. W. 157; Note: 15 Am. Dec. 99. If the witness
admits having made inconsistent statements there is no reason for
proof by other witnesses, and some courts specifically exclude further
proof. Atchison T. N S. F. Ry. Co. v. Feehan, 149 Ill. 202, 36 N. E.
I036; but there is authority to the contrary. Markel v. Moudy, 13
Neb. 322, 14 NW. 409, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, sec. 1037. If he
denies them, after proper foundation has been laid and the prior in-
consistent statements are proved by other witnesses, the question then
arises, what weight is to be given by the jury to such statements and
how can the proper consideration be secured? It is elementary that
the credibility of witnesses is in all cases for the jury. Lincoln v.
Felt, 132 Mich. 49, 92 N. 'W. 780; and it is for the jury to determine the
credibility of a witness whose testimony has been impeached, Hed-
rick v. Ball, 84 Ill. App. 523; or how far his credibility is affected
thereby, Banker's Union v. Schiverin, 67 Neb. 303, 92 N. W. 158; or
whether a witness has been successfully impeached. Oliver v. Pate,
43 Ind. 132. But the effect of proving contradictory statements ex-
tends no further than the question of credibility; it does not tend to
establish the truth of the matters embraced in the contradictory state-
ments; it simply goes to the credibility of'the witness. Harriman v.
Ry. Co., 173 Mass. 28, 53 N. E. 156; Note: 82 Am. Rep. 39; and it is
the duty of the court to so instruct the jury. Day v. Sampsell, 148 Ill.
App. 88, approved in Ferrier v, Chicago R. Co., I85 Ill. App. 326.
Such statements are admissible solely to impeach the witness and for
no other purpose. To admit them as affirmative proof of the facts
to which they relate would be to substitute the statements of a witness,
generally when not made under oath, as evidence between the parties,
for his evidence given under the sanction of an oath upon the trial.
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This would in truth be obnoxious to the hearsay rule. WIGMORt ON
EVIDENCE, Vol. 2, sec. ioi8. As stated by Shaw, C. J. in 1852, in the
case of Goul v. Norfolk Lead Co., 9 Cush. (Mass.) 338, "It is no
evidence whatever that the facts are as he formerly stated them, and
though appeals are sometimes made to the jury that it is so, it is the
province of the court to inform them that it is not so." To properly
charge the jury in this regard is of primary importance so that they
will not be confused as to the probative value of evidence offered.
Therefore the proper consideration can be secured only through in-
struction by the court as to the weight and effect of proved prior in-
consistent statements. Instructions which embody these general prin-
ciples are encouraged and are generally held to be sufficient and proper.
Nussbaum v. Louisville Ry. Co., (Ky.) 57 SW. 249.
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OUTLINE OF JUDICIAL COUNCIL BILL
The Judicial Council Bill, House Bill No. 216, introduced by the
House State Affairs Committee, may be summarized as follows:
Section i provides for establishment of the Council, consisting of
all Judges of the Supreme and District Courts, one Judge of the County
Court to be selected by the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, the
Dean of the University Law School, and five members of the Bar to
be selected by the Executive Committee of the State Bar Association.
This would make a rather large group, and there may, therefore, be
some objection on that ground.
Section 2 provides for terms of office, the members of Courts
retaining membership during their incumbency except the County
Judge and members of the Bar, who will be chosen for two years,
commencing the first Monday of January in odd numbered years.
Section 3 provides for organization, the Chief Justice to be presi-
dent and an Executive Secretary to be selected from within or with-
out the Council.
Section 4 provides for meetings at least twice a year, the first
meeting to be within six months after the act takes effect.
Section 5 makes it the continuous duty of the Council to seek the
simplification of procedure, the expediting of court business, and the
better administration of justice generally.
Section 6 empowers the Council to hold public meetings and hear-
ings, require the attendance of witnesses and the production of books
and documents, the District Courts being granted power to enforce
obedience to subpoenas and compel the giving of testimony.
Section 7 provides for organization of a bureau of statistics and
provides for reports from various officials of courts and public
institutions.
Section 8 provides for an annual report to the Governor, includ-
ing legislative recommendations and recommendations for change of
rules of court.
Section 9 provides for meetings of the Judges of the Supreme and
District Courts immediately following each meeting of the Council
for the purpose of considering the recommendations of the Council.
Section io provides that the expense incurred in work of the
Council by members of the Supreme and District Courts shall:be deem-
ed expense in. their official positions, and that expenses of other
members. of the Council shall be paid. out of the State Bar Fund.
Section i i repeals acts or parts of acts in conflict with the bill.
